

An Afrocentric analysis of Radical Economic Transformation in South Africa, 2014-2017

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Abstract: After democratic dispensation of 1994, the new government adopted a number of initiatives to transform the economy and alleviate divisions of the past. The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) ideology which served as the guiding policy framework to the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies called for radical measures such as nationalisation of strategic sectors. But the ANC followed neo-liberal path in implementing adopted policies such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) and the National Development Plan (NDP). During Zuma's tenure, the persisting triple socio-economic challenges (inequality, unemployment and poverty) spurred many calls for Radical Economic Transformation (RET). As a result, RET received attention from scholars, academia and media alike. However, many of them analyse and understand RET through Eurocentric perspective which is informed by the experiences of Western society. This article employs Afrocentricity as the alternative lens to provide African experiences that should lay a basis for analysis, understanding and implementation of RET as the strategic policy to reduce inequality, unemployment and poverty. The central argument of this desktop article is that African experiences should inform any study on any African phenomenon. Methodologically, the article employs Afrocentric qualitative research methodology to provide potential remedies on the research phenomenon.

Keywords: Afrocentricity, African National Congress, National Democratic Revolution, Radical Economic Transformation, Jacob Zuma.

INTRODUCTION

Leaning on the Afrocentric qualitative research approach in the form of document review, this article analyse the RET policy from 2014-2017. The fundamental thread followed by this article acknowledges the significance of historicity in the discussion of the ANC's economic

policies. Thus, the discussion of RDP, GEAR, ASGISA, NGP, NDP and RET. This is done by looking at how these policies came to be implemented and how were they ultimately abandoned. The central focus of this article is on RET as pillaring this Afrocentric article. This article has also adopted the periodization approach from 2014 to 2019 for limitation of the central objective, hence, into a particular time-context. Policy recommendations will also be made in order to help the ANC policy makers for future policy implementation plans.

Theoretical Contribution: Afrocentricity

This study is premised upon the elements of Afrocentricity as better explained by Asante (1990, 2003) and it is attested to be mainly African. Its dominant precepts encompass “grounding, orientation and perspective” which makes up the analytical class of the theory (Modupe 2003). This is unlike realism, idealism and Marxism with precepts which are western dominated (Chilisa 2012). This article raises an Afrocentric critique of which also embraces the progressive views of conventional political theories (Asante 2003). Leaning heavily on Afrocentricity, this article proposes a dismissive dual standing on the production of knowledge (as either objective or subjective; empirical or non-empirical; good or evil; etc.) (Maserumule 2011, 2015). Thus, this article intentionally shows a combination of both non-empirical and empirical facets as it wants to yield out holistic discoveries about its central objectives. It is admittable that this is an almost intractable task in occasions where the researcher curbs himself to either non-empirical or empirical methods. When interpreted differently, it becomes observable that the combination of these methods are comprehended in this article as interdependent of each other. The narrative aroused by this articulation is not only limited to Afrocentric scholars as it is also dispensed by proponents of the theories of quantum physics and social constructivism who also see reality as the concomitant of inter-subjectivities and thus, context-based (Shai 2016; Nabudere 2012; Simmons and Martin 2001). Therefore, the principal direction pursued by this article is that the concept of ‘perceptual space’ among the researched and the researcher is imaginary (Baugh and Guion 2016). Thus, in the process of decoloniality in our lifetime, this can be obtained by shifting from the so-called scientific perceptual space (as advocated by positivist scholars) to cooperative academic immersion between the researched and the researcher. This is to argue that the authors of this article entered this subject’s discourse as Africans, only to conduct this study as directed by the guidance and influence of Africa-centred principles of knowledge production (Shai 2016). Interpreted differently, the culture, history, overall consciousness and live experience of the researchers had a fair-minded space in the qualitative outcome on the discoveries of this study

(Asante 2003). As such, the authors of this article introduced Afrocentricity on this study in order to do away with the marginalisation of the African genuine voices on the discourse of RET in South Africa (Maleka and Shai 2016).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodologically, this article relied heavily on qualitative research methodology (as a reinforcer of Afrocentric research methods) (Owusu-Ansah and Mji 2013; Mkabela 2005; Shai 2017, 65). This article drew data from books, articles, reports as well as popular and academic literature. The information collected was analysed using Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) as better explained by Anderson (2017). The fundamental pillars of every qualitative research approach of credibility, dependability and confirmability were ensured by the utility of data triangulation.

LITERATURE REVIEW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID ECONOMIC POLICIES

RDP

This is a project that was instigated by the ANC prior South Africa's 1994 general elections as an all-inclusive and very determined national project (Brits 2014: 507). The "RDP base document", a by-product of the Alliance led by ANC was also a comprehensive charter which championed the meeting of the precepts of the Freedom Charter. The white paper of RDP, which was embraced in 1994 by the Government of National Unity (GNU), attested a strong dedication to both monetary and fiscal disciplines, whilst neglecting any insinuation of nationalisation (Mosala, Venter and Bain 2017). This paper also spoke of the likelihood of financing RDP through the use of under-utilised state assets and privatisation (Jeffery 2010: 240). This paper also explained RDP as a coherent, socio-economic framework and integrated with principal priority of creating work opportunities via economic growth. The RDP's principal goals as highlighted also encompassed the scrapping of inequalities and poverty and the expanding of manufactured exports and also development, which was uneven in all the regions of the country (RSA 1994). In perspective, RDP could be argued to have had the aspects of liberalisation, convertibility and privatisation (Marais 2001: 237). Thus, RDP demonstrated that South Africa's monetary policy would acknowledge the South African Reserve Bank's autonomy, with industrial policy placing much attention on re-establishment of industries and rightly pinpointing important new areas (like mineral processing) for the development of industries (Mosala, Venter and Bain 2017). Jeffery (2010: 240) believe that trade policies were

liberalised in line with South Africa's compact to the 1994 Marrakesh agreement which established World Trade Organisation (WTO) with the aim of promoting manufactured exports. This project was progressive in some spheres, like the social security whereby the ANC government managed to come up with a very strong social welfare system. This was accompanied by free health care system for children and pregnant women and also free meals for school children (Cling 2001: 67). South Africans now have access to medical services with at least 500 new clinics in place. Under RDP, at least more than 2 million homes were electrified, providing at least 63% of South African population with access to electricity by then (Cling 2001: 67). The programme of RDP as nationally microeconomic as it was however deserted after 2 years due to insufficient economic growth to fund it, thus the incapacity of the public administration to execute it (Brits 2014: 507). The policy's failure was also due to the lack of policy implementation and coordination required skills in the ANC's ranks, different intra-organisational pitfalls and due to the fact that the faithfulness of the incumbent civil servants was often questioned. Shortage of relevant resources was a contributing factor too (Luiz 2007; Wallis 1995). Precisely, R2.5 billion which made 2% of the national budget specifically for RDP was never sufficient to reduce the log-jam in the provision of services and equal infrastructure to the Apartheid marginalised and underprivileged (Luiz 2007). The incapability of the ANC government to marshal the RDP and make it a success and also the socio-economic policy was a huge problem. On the 14th June 1996, after the announcement of the country's associated volatility and currency's depreciation, Trevor Manuel (Former Minister of Finance) proposed Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy blueprint in Parliament (Abedian and Ajam 2009: 82). The then government illustrated that GEAR was a policy blueprint which was founded on the existing elements of RDP (Jeffery 2010: 245).

GEAR

Stemming from the above discussion, it is clear that GEAR was proposed and implemented as a policy blueprint that sought to reshape and rebuild the country's economic Bin in line with the policy objectives set out in RDP (Jeffery 2010: 245). Put differently, this policy was premised upon free market stratagem with a very intense attention on economic development (Brits 2014: 507). The GEAR document emphasizes the objectives of the 1996 Department of Finance as stressing out the increasing economic development in line with intense job creation as the principal drive to realise improved standards of living and income for all South Africans. Job creation ensures that there is a strong drive for redistribution, endorsed by the government

water and sanitation, education, social security service and welfare provision, housing and health (Department of Finance 1996). As such, GEAR made targets of at least 400 000 job opportunities and a growth rate of 6% per year by 2000 (Department of Finance 1996; Jeffery 2010: 245; Makino 2013: 4). GEAR also prioritised the fiscal deficit of at least 3% from 4.5% by 1999. South Africa's monetary policy addressed financial and inflation stability and also championed exchange control relaxation. The country's industrial and trade policy, in exchange, placed much attention on boosting international competitiveness and employment. Much attention was more placed on advancing employment and competitiveness in tourism and manufacturing sectors with industrial support initiatives of productivity, innovation, tax exemptions, small business support programmes, tax holdings, and the nourishment of competition legislation (Luiz 2007). The execution of GEAR as a policy was speed-processed and it was rapidly glorified by both international and local business communities. In the year 2001, GEAR's effectiveness was tested against its targeted goals and it was determined that its economic results were mixed. GEAR also safeguarded in order to strengthen South Africa's financial state and also modulated the country's interest figures and piloted inflation to be under control (Habib 2013: 81). In addition, the country's budget deficit was recorded at GDP of 2.2% with importation tariffs underneath the expected 7.6% of the value of investment and imports by State Owned Companies (SOCs), growing at 13,5 % yearly (Luiz 2007). However, GEAR failed heavily in other areas. The budgetary gains were accompanied by a destructive social cost. Poverty and inequality levels increased flamboyantly in the years preceding the execution of GEAR as a policy framework (Habib 2013:81). South Africa's growth rate during GEAR never exceeded 5% from the promised growth rate of 6% and this also was escorted by at least 30% unemployment rate increase (Gevisser 2009: 252). In 2000, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) equalled to less than 1% of the GDP and the employment rate in non-agricultural activities decreased by an approximated 3.3% because of this savage austerity and diminishing employment expedients effected, the consequence of this was a preservation of inequality. Therefore, South Africans never enjoyed the promised economic benefits of GEAR and it was consequently overtaken by the so called Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative-South Africa (ASGISA) in the year 2006 (Mosala, Venter and Bain 2017).

ASGISA

As a policy blueprint for South Africa, it was proclaimed by Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (Former Deputy President) in 2005 only to be launched in 2006. The fundamental principal objective of ASGISA was to reduce unemployment and poverty by 2014, in accordance with

the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Annon 2006). In addition, ASGISA also sought to improve South Africa's job creation and economic performance capacities. To achieve or realise this, the government made a promise that it would increase public disbursement on fixed capital investment to at least R370 billion for the succeeding 3 years and to also increase its stance on alleviating the inequalities as well as helping the marginalised poor people. Precisely, this policy was proposed to curb the gap which existed between both the first and second South African economies with the intention of doing away with the consequences brought forward by the second economy (Jeffery 2010: 255). The foregoing combined together makes: over-valued and volatile rand, shortage of skilled labour, heavy regulatory system on small enterprises, investment and infrastructure backlogs, lack of competition in different sectors of the economy, increased costs in service and transport provision and inadequacy in state leadership and capacity. Since this policy was given a short period of time, it becomes almost an impossible task to evaluate its successes or otherwise. But it has to some extent made progress in the areas of infrastructure including the public sector spending with an increase from 4.6% to 9.6% for the period 2006 to 2010 (Mbola 2009). Poverty and unemployment remained constant or otherwise exacerbated after its adoption by the country. It was during Mbeki's last day in office when this policy was displaced by New Growth Path (Mosala, Venter and Bain 2017).

NGP

NGP was publicised by Jacob Zuma (Former President) in his 2010 State of the Nation Address (SONA). The NGP outlines the principal provocations of South Africa as poverty, inequalities and amass unemployment (Morris 2013). The policy intended to alleviate unemployment by 10% and create an estimated 5 million jobs by 2020 by the use of infrastructure programme (Gumede 2012). NGP made up policies which dual objectives advanced: voluntarily and temporarily regulating the incomes of the elite (upper middle class) and also advancing the lives of those who live below the economic ladder (Habib 2013: 98). Towards a way forward, NGP tabled a number of strategic propositions to deal with the identified difficulties: increasing incomes, deepening both regional and democratic markets by fattening employment, engaging in measures which will improve income distribution and equity and also enlarge the country's market in for services and goods through placing much attention on exports to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and other big economies (Patel 2011). Since this policy was also given a short period of time, NGP's successes or effectiveness cannot be easily measured in the light of admitting that it takes time to implement a country's policy

(Gumede 2012). Alternatively, the National Development Plan (NDP) was proposed and constructed on top of NGP to be only introduced in 2012 (Mosala, Venter and Bain 2017)

NDP

As a policy blueprint, it became the biggest and most favoured macroeconomic policy of the ANC led government, which stressed out economic development as a road that will curb the problems of inequality, unemployment, redistribution and poverty. Hence, this policy makes a long term eyesight and stretched up to 2030. NDP's significant plans are to create at least 11 million jobs by 2030, which will banish the income-driven poverty and inequality. In economic perspective, it is clear that in order to achieve this, the Gini coefficient should be able to plummet to 0.6 from 0.69 by the year 2030. Among the significant few, NDP advances a corrupt-free society, accountable government and a hefty conformity to ethical behaviour throughout the society. NDP also appreciate the economic progress recorded since 1994 like expanded access to health care facilities and education, water, social security, electricity and housing all done through economic stability (National Planning Commission 2013). Thus, the supporters of NDP in this instances continue to be the Democratic Alliance (DA) and alternative liberal organisations which continue to compress the implementation of NDP whilst some which constitute the Tripartite Alliance (ANC, SACP and COSATU) argue that this is a treachery of the Freedom Charter and National Democratic Revolution (NDR) (Mosala, Venter and Bain 2017). National Union of Mine Workers (NUMSA) in 2013 argued that the NDP ignores the surviving patterns of control and ownership of the country's economy and therefore advances for a labour market deregulation and minimalist state. In addition, they also pointed out that the NDP saw the process of land reform as being correct in its roots within the model of willing buyer and willing seller to only advances a neo-liberal macroeconomic policy. As such, the NDP is attested to have had no scheme to endorse and reinforce the manufacturing sector together with industrialisation. In preference, it becomes clear that NDP fortifies vulnerability on raw material exportation (Jim 2013).

ORIGINS OF RET

RET gained popularity after it was proclaimed by Former Pres Zuma in his January 8 2017 ANC speech that the country needed RET. Statements which were issued out on RET were surrounded on the issues of inclusive economic growth, land redistribution and dealing with white monopoly capital tendencies (Mostert 2015). But it became almost an impossible task to define what inclusive growth means. The same confusion escalated to even associate this with

broad-based growth and / pro-poor growth (Fourie 2014). In line with Note 2 of the ANC policy discussion document, RET is a program that was instigated at Mangaung Conference in 2012. This was when it was decided that RET was relevant and right to effect the NDP and NFP together with the Industrial Policy Plan (Mpofu 2018). Alternative progressive political views argue that RET originates in the ANC's Marxist rooted national democratic revolution (NDR) ideology which cores the goal of the "resolution of the national grievance arising from colonialism and apartheid" (Steward 2017). This is due to the affirmation that the ANC is still trapped in the past apartheid experiences that even though if achieved political freedom, it still did not achieve economic freedom. This is supported by Zuma who insisted that "the economy was still controlled by white males". This notion produced a view which ground rotted on the believe that there is an unaccomplished revolutionary mandate. Thus, the main objective now was to realise 'economic liberation' through RET. Steward (2017) also believes that the main opponent in the ANC's RET is "white monopoly capital".

To be precise, an economic inclusion needs a structural change indeed. The foregoing should be understood within the context of apprehending the location of this in the 1955 Freedom Charter which articulated that "all people in South Africa should enjoy equal rights and opportunities, including that: the people shall share in the country's wealth; the land shall be shared among those who work it; there shall be work and security; the doors of learning and culture shall be opened; and there shall be houses, security and comfort" (ANC 2017; Molewa 2017). So, RET in an Afrocentric context is a policy which extends structural economic change to move from exploitation of raw materials to manufacturing and beneficiation to realise the will of the people. This is to also expand black economic participation in the commanding heights of the country's economy. Thus, its main and principal purpose should be to do away with racialised and gendered, class injected inequalities in South Africa by affording people with equal incomes, access to economic chances and ownership of assets (Molewa, 2017; ANC, 2017). Even Cyril Ramaphosa (President of South Africa) also stated that RET was all about realising a more collective and inclusive economic growth. With RET, it was hoped that the ANC led government would increase employment, de-racialise the economy, create sustainable growth and increase investment. The RET was proposed after noting that the country's lion share of the economy was still under 8% of the population of which are whites with 80% blacks left out in land and companies ownership (Graduate-Business-Business 2017). Rob Davies (Former Minister of Trade and Industry) demonstrated that the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) was significant in realising RET as it is heavily expanded in the ANC led

government's all-inclusive plans and policy to curb the fundamental challenges of industrial and economic growth and raced driven inequality, unemployment and poverty. IPAP was attested to be the element of the Nine Point Plan, intending to advance a more diversified and competitive economy with an elevated world wide share of products (Davies 2017).

Osthuizen (2016) believes that RET was a result of the efforts to do away with socioeconomic rights have been violated for many millions of South Africans. Alternatively, Mutize and Gooseland (2017) resonates that Zuma addressed this well in his 2017 SONA when he spoke of the needs to curb "white monopoly capital" and blamed it for the marginalisation of majority of South Africans from mainstream economy for the past two decades. This is also believed to be not a brand new concept as both Mutize and Gooseland (2017) advances the belief that it has always been used to move attention away from the main problems facing the country's economy. Thus in order for RET to be a progressive policy, it ought be linked with the NDP. Balkanran (2017) says that the country's youthful population, falling inequality and improved education system together with urbanisation will be very fruitful for RET.

FUNDAMENTAL PILLARS OF RET

Returning land to our people and supporting land reform

RET proposed policy blueprint talks about the ANC led government returning land to Black people of which is attested to be also supported by the Constitution of South Africa. The foregoing is supported by the constitution's dedication of 'just and equitable' reimbursement of the land in order to speed process land redistribution purposes in order to codify and replace the 'market based valuations of land' (Ndedi and Kok 2017). The process of land reform can only be achieved if the expropriation of land with compensation law is passed and executed as a way of agreeing with the constitutional court's discoveries that the "agreement on the quantum of fair compensation is not a pre-condition for land redistribution to take place and should never pay a premium in purchasing land for the purpose of land reform" (Bernstein 2017).

RET include inter alia, land reform process which many SA thinks are being undertaken at the slow pace. In 2016, the outgoing President Jacob Zuma asserts that new instruments are needed to accelerate land reform to facilitate reduction of poverty, inequality and unemployment. He echoed the same statement in 2017 by saying that poverty, inequality and unemployment are

caused by land which was taken, not bought. He goes on by stating that the existing government is buying the land back as if it was sold before (Jackielsohn and Duvenhage, 2018: 34).

In December 2018, ANC National Conference adopted a Resolution to formalize a policy of expropriating land without compensation. The same Resolution illustrates that the execution of that policy should not pose adverse effect on agriculture, food security, economic growth and job creation. Furthermore, the ruling party passed a motion in Parliament that paved a way for Parliaments Constitutional Review Committee to conduct public hearings pertaining to the expropriation of land without compensation and to report back to the National Assembly (NA) by 30 August 2018 (Jackielsohn and Duvenhage, 2018: 34). On the other hand, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) support state ownership of land as is the case with mineral and petroleum through the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act No. 28 of 2008. In essence, the state should preside over land expropriated without compensation and promote the use of land for sustainable development (Jackielsohn and Duvenhage, 2018: 34).

Increasing black ownership and control in the economy

The objective of realizing black ownership of the economy and commanding heights was attested to can be able to be realized through the use of wide ambits of instruments. Preference was afforded to safeguarding black ownership in the transpiring new economic sectors like the new gas sector and the country's ocean economy as outlined well by Operation Phakisa's work. And some of the fundamental codes of BEE were to be revised across all different sectors of the economy so to ensure effective enforcement of black ownership (Ndedi and Kok 2017). Equally important is the property sector transformation which is to be realized when bills such as the proposed Property Practitioner Bill are passed as legislation to afford black participation in the real estate sector. Transformation in the mining sector was also recommended to be able to be realized through amendments of the MPRDA. The opening of the economy to new players can also be done through the intermixture of developing financial institutions like the merging of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and National Empowerment Fund (NEF) which provide enough economic access leverage to black South Africans (ANC 2017).

Activating small businesses and co-operatives

South African Black business entrepreneurs would be progressive if they had access to financial support such as the improve market access and also tax breaks. This implies that there

needs to be a programme which will assist all of the entrepreneurs to develop small co-operatives and business (Bernstein 2017). This will definitely assist black industrialists. All supply chains in private and public sectors should also be accessible encompassing those in the retail sectors to all medium and small sized black businesses. And this can also be done if there is an improve technological information tools to create visibility market opportunities (ANC 2017).

Raising the level of investment

Since, the NDP outlines a clear vision that investment should grow from 19% to 30% in both public and private sectors, policy confidence is the principal key for a long time investment. Efforts must be in place to ensure that policy uncertainty curbs are not entertained (ANC 2017). The ANC led government ought to ensure that there is an audit of regulatory and policy constraints to investment and place a well-articulated timeframe for dealing with them, especially linked to the performance of ministers in contracts. Trust in the country's economy can only be enhanced by trustworthy initiatives which strive for job creation to enhance long-term economic stability (Ndedi and Kok 2017). Under the short term, investment can only be enhanced if there is a clear objective to control the national debt to preserve the country's 'investment-grade credit rating'. And also if there is good governance and the maintenance of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and also the application of global standards and norms in regulating both the financial and other sectors. Thus, as the investor confidence grows in the country's economy, this enhances the multiplier effect to public and private sector investments (ANC 2017).

Strengthening social justice and conditions for the poor and working class

The ANC ought to build confidence in its constituency by improving the quality of health and public education services by the use of affordable and reliable transport services, curbing unfair competition in the private sector, curbing unfair labour practices and also put it forward for the people to be notified that there are systems to counter corrupt activities and prevent corrupt practices from taking place (Ndedi & Kok, 2017; ANC 2017). In the process of protecting the working class captivates, there is a need to informalise labour market decrees (ANC 2017).

Improving the employment impact of infrastructure projects

Fundamentally, the country's ongoing extensive investment in water, transport infrastructure, rail and electricity is important to the transformation of the economy. Equally important is the maximization of the employment multipliers through the use of skill transference and a substantial emphasis to localization (sourcing local inputs) rather than internationally (Bernstein 2017). Where necessary, means should be put in place with the intention of making contracts for black owned businesses and promote Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) (ANC 2017).

Reducing inequality and poverty

If people have enough job opportunities, inequality will be curbed and initiatives such as the implementation of minimum wages are relevant in improving the lives of the low earning income employees. As such access to subsidized basic services and social grants help in bridging and reducing the poverty live. Therefore, the social grants of South Africa should at all times be conducted efficiently and defended ideally as they maintain a lifeline of the poorer South African dejected masses of our country (ANC 2017).

Dismantling monopoly practices and structures

There ought to be competition legislation enforced strongly with the intention of curbing out all monopolistic activities. Thus, all anti-competitive practices and price fixing should be curbed out in the country's economy. In the name of advancing this dedication, the ANC welcomed the Competition Commission's investigation into the market allocation and price-fixing in foreign exchange dealings by numerous currency traders and banks and also welcomed SAA's anti-competitive conduct as an SOE as a resolute footstep anti-monopoly practices in the country (Ndedi & Kok, 2017; Bernstein, 2017). RET also outlines that the ANC led government should command a well articulated inquiry into the fundamental construction of the country's economy. This has to be done in order to advocate ways to minimize and detach barriers to approach and deconstruct oligopolistic and monopolistic structures in definite key economic sectors. E.g a bank which is owned by a bank, most importantly a transformed one can widen entry to banking services for most people and can help in transforming the structure of the financial sector in the country (ANC, 2017; Oosthuizen, 2016). In line with RET, South Africa should maintain its upright to transform the entire economic structure from one dominated by colonial extraction to one which is dominated by expansion of domestic industrial services and production. This can only be found if international and regional

organisations such as World Trade Organisation (WTO), European Union- Free Trade Area (EU-FTA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGO) embrace the growth of brand new industries, development initiatives and research as well as to provide protection to unprotected industries. And all measures should be put in place to curb Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) from Africa and South Africa respectively (ANC 2017).

Improving integration into the African economy

What matters the most out of all of this is the objective of advancing African Regional Integration (RI). This is to say that the country's economy should be integrated into that of the continent at large. This implies that measures need to be put in place to expand Free Trade Areas (FTAs) which are already existing in Africa and SADC respectively into bigger more extensive FTAs. The underlying aim of all of this is to support African industrialization and intra-African trade by expanding regional markets (Ndedi and Kok 2017).

Stimulating inclusive growth

Under the RET document, the above interventions are articulated to can be able to move the entire country to a supplemental inclusive growth. This initiative of inclusive can only be a success through the use of strategies of a 'democratic developmental state'. As well articulated that growth individually is not that well inclusive. Thus, to be able to be inclusive, growth ought to be able to make a combination of expansion of productive activities, increase level of employment, fattening GDP per capita and enormously expanded opportunities especially for black South Africans. A well-executed and conceived modification schemes are needed to advance growth's quality. Thus, the elements of growth such as increase investor confidence, reduced red-tape, preservation of investment grade rating, limitation and reduction of the monopolistic structures and activities and certainty of policy in key strategic areas such as infrastructural development and mining sector ought to be attended effectively as they are the principal elements of the country's entire transformation programme (ANC 2017).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article strives to locate the analysis and understanding of RET into African experiences serving as a foundation to study, understand and address African phenomenon. It argues that RET should be understood in the context that most SA black people are at the margins of their

experiences, including the means of production such as land, industries and capital. While most post-apartheid policies seek to address SA triple challenges, their neoliberal path shift them away from any attempt of relocating black people to the means of production. The article recommends that RET will be progressive if businesses embrace radical resolution towards skills upliftment and job creation which will also intensify the B-BBEE programme 'scorecard' for preferable success chances and properly dedicating to an inclusive resolution for whole supply chain. Such instances and transformation should be embraced in documents like the mining charter in order to show how transformation can happen. Extractive companies should contribute on the development of skills needed for mineral beneficiation through building technical colleges and sourcing workers from such institutions. Poverty reduction policy of the department of agriculture should be enforced by mandating retailers to source their product from black emerging farmers. The state should expropriate land without compensation and redistribute it. Labour brokers should be abolished and companies encouraged to grant shares to their workers to avoid recurring strikes which stall economic growth.

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